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Abstract
We investigate the performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules using ﬁve macroeconomic
models that reﬂect a wide range of views on aggregate dynamics. We identify the key characteristics
of rules that are robust to model uncertainty: such rules respond to the one-year ahead inﬂation
forecast and to the current output gap, and incorporate a substantial degree of policy inertia. In
contrast, rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust and are prone to generating indetermi-
nacy. In light of these results, we identify a robust benchmark rule that performs very well in all
ﬁve models over a wide range of policy preferences.
Keywords: Inﬂation forecast targeting, optimal monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
A number of industrialized countries have adopted explicit inﬂation forecast targeting regimes, in
which the stance of policy is adjusted to ensure that the inﬂation rate is projected to return to target
over a speciﬁed horizon.1 Such a regime has also received formal consideration recently by the Bank
of Japan, while Svensson (1999) and others have recommended that the Federal Reserve and the
European Central Bank should follow suit.2 In principle, forecast-based policies can incorporate
comprehensive and up-to-date macroeconomic information and can account for transmission lags
and other structural features of the economy. Furthermore, the relative simplicity of such rules may
serve in facilitating public communication regarding monetary policy objectives and procedures.3
The existing literature on forecast-based policy rules has generally proceeded by computing
rules that are optimal or near-optimal for a speciﬁc macroeconometric model.4 However, given
substantial uncertainty about the “true” structure of the economy (cf. McCallum (1988), Taylor
(1999b)), it is essential to identify the characteristics of policy rules that perform well across a rea-
sonably wide range of models; that is, to identify rules that are robust to model uncertainty.5 This
approach seems particularly important in analyzing forecast-based rules, since the performance of
these rules is contingent on the accuracy of the forecasting model. Furthermore, with an inappropri-
ate choice of policy parameters, forecast-based rules may fail to ensure a unique stationary rational
expectations equilibrium (cf. Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2000a)); in such cases,
excessive macroeconomic volatility can result from self-fulﬁlling expectations that are unrelated to
macroeconomic fundamentals.
Thus, in this paper we investigate the performance and robustness of forecast-based rules using
four structural macroeconometric models that have been estimated using postwar U.S. data, along
1Leiderman and Svensson, eds (1995), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen
(1999) provide extensive background on and analysis of inﬂation targeting regimes in Australia, Canada, Israel, New
Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Explicit inﬂation targeting has also been adopted by a substantial
number of emerging market countries; see Schaecter, Stone and Zelmer (2000).
2Svensson (1999), Goodhart (2000), and Svensson and Woodford (1999) recommend that centralbanks commit
to an inﬂation forecast-targeting rule.
3Clarida and Gertler (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), Orphanides (1998b), and Chinn and Dooley (1997)
have found that estimated forecast-based reaction functions provide reasonably accurate descriptions of interest rate
behavior in Germany, Japan, and the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, adopting an explicit
forecast-based rule as a policy benchmark might primarily involve a change in the communication of policy, and not
necessarily a major shift in policy actions.
4Such research has been performed at the Reserve Bank of Australia (de Brouwer and Ellis (1998)), the Bank of
Canada (Black, Macklem and Rose (1997a); Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1999)), the Bank of England (Haldane,
ed (1995), Batini and Haldane (1999); Batini and Nelson (2001)), and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Black,
Cassino, Drew, Hansen, Hunt, Rose and Scott (1997b)). Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) analyzed the performance
of instrument and targeting rules in a small adaptive-expectations model of the U.S. economy.
5Monetary policy under model uncertainty has previously been analyzed by Karakitsos and Rustem (1984), Becker,
Dwolatsky, Karakitsos and Rustem (1986), Frankel and Rockett (1988), Holtham and Hughes-Hallett (1992), and
Christodoulakis, Kemball-Cook and Levine (1993). Most recently, Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) evaluated
the robustness to model uncertainty of optimized simple policy rules involving current and lagged macroeconomic
variables, while Taylor (1999a) summarizes the performance of ﬁve rules in an even wider range of macroeconomic
models.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 6
with a small stylized model derived from microeconomic foundations with calibrated parameter
values. All ﬁve models incorporate the assumptions of rational expectations, short-run nominal
inertia, and long-run monetary neutrality. Nevertheless, these models exhibit substantial diﬀerences
in price and output dynamics, reﬂecting ongoing theoretical and empirical controversies as well as
diﬀerences in degree of aggregation, estimation method and sample period, etc.
We assume that the policymaker is able to commit to a time-invariant rule, and that the
policymaker’s objective is to minimize a weighted sum of the unconditional variances of the inﬂation
rate and the output gap, subject to an upper bound on nominal interest rate volatility.6 We focus
on simple forecast-based rules in which the short-term nominal interest rate is adjusted in response
to current or projected future values of the inﬂation rate and the output gap as well as to the
lagged nominal interest rate. We begin by determining the conditions on the policy rule parameters
(including the choice of forecast horizon) that are required to ensure a unique stationary rational
expectations equilibrium in each model. Next we determine the optimal forecast horizons and other
policy parameters that minimize the policymaker’s loss function in each model, and we analyze the
robustness of each optimized rule by evaluating its performance in each of the other models. Having
identiﬁed a particular class of robust policy rules, we proceed to determine the policy parameters
that minimize the average loss function across all ﬁve models; from a Bayesian perspective, this
approach corresponds to the case in which the policymaker has ﬂat prior beliefs about the extent
to which each model provides an accurate description of the true economy.
Our analysis concludes by identifying a speciﬁc forecast-based policy rule that can serve as a
robust benchmark for monetary policy; this rule performs remarkably well for a wide range of policy
preferences as well as for a wide range of prior beliefs about the dynamic properties of the economy.
More generally, our results provide strong support for policy rules that respond to a short-horizon
forecast (no more than one year ahead) of a smoothed measure of inﬂation, that incorporate a
substantial response to the current output gap, and that involve a relatively high degree of policy
inertia (also referred to as “interest rate smoothing”).7 We ﬁnd that such rules are highly robust
to model uncertainty, whereas rules that utilize longer-horizon inﬂation forecasts and rules that
omit an explicit output gap response are much less robust, and in fact are particularly prone to
generating multiple equilibria.
Finally, it should be noted that our approach of evaluating the robustness of monetary policy
rules to model uncertainty is complementary to Bayesian methods that analyze the policy impli-
cations of uncertainty about the parameters of a particular model, as well as to robust control
methods that indicate how to minimize the “worst-case” losses due to perturbations from a given
6For recent analysis of the monetary policy implications of time-inconsistency and commitment vs. discretion, see
S¨ oderlind (1999), Woodford (1999), Svensson and Woodford (2000), and Svensson (2001).
7For analysis of interest rate smoothing in outcome-based rules, see Goodfriend (1991), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), Williams (1999), Levin et al. (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000), Woodford (1999), and Woodford (2000b).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 7
model.8 Unlike these other approaches, however, our method naturally lends itself to situations in
which non-nested models represent competing perspectives regarding the dynamic structure of the
economy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the key issues regarding
the speciﬁcation of forecast-based policy rules. In Section 3, we analyze the restrictions on such
rules that are required to ensure a unique rational expectations equilibrium. In Section 4, we
analyze the properties of forecast-based rules that are optimized for each individual model. Section
5 considers the extent to which these optimized rules are robust to model uncertainty, and identiﬁes
the characteristics of robust policy rules. In Section 6, we ﬁnd the policy parameters that minimize
the average loss function across all ﬁve models, and then we identify a speciﬁc forecast-based rule
that can serve as a benchmark for policy analysis. Section 7 summarizes our conclusions and
considers directions for further research. Finally, the Appendix provides background information
regarding alternative forecast-based policy rules taken from the literature, as well as further details
about the models and about the solution and optimization methods used in this paper.
2 Speciﬁcation of Forecast-based Policy Rules
In this section, we consider the choices involved in specifying a forecast-based monetary policy rule,
in light of the theoretical arguments for these rules as well as the characteristics of various rules
that have been considered in the literature. As noted above, we focus our attention on rules in
which the short-term nominal interest rate responds directly to a small set of variables such as the
inﬂation rate, the output gap, and the lagged interest rate.
2.1 The Case for Preemptive Policy
One intuitively appealing argument for forecast-based rules is that monetary policy acts with a
substantial lag, and hence current policy actions should be determined in light of the macroeconomic
conditions that are expected to prevail when such actions will have substantial eﬀect. (This rationale
is referred to as “lag encompassing” by Batini and Haldane (1999).) Of course, since every forecast
can be expressed in terms of current and lagged state variables, a forecast-based rule cannnot
yield any improvement in macroeconomic stability relative to the fully optimal policy rule (which
incorporates all of the relevant state variables). However, a simple forecast-based policy rule might
perform substantially better than a simple outcome-based rule (that is, a rule involving only a
small set of current and lagged variables). For example, consider a sharp hike in import oil prices
that gradually passes through to prices of domestically-produced output: an outcome-based policy
8Optimalpol icy under parameter uncertainty was investigated in the seminalpaper of Brainard (1967) and was
extended by the work of Kendrick (1982) and others; recent examples include Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and
Wieland (2000). Applications of robust control methods include von zur Muehlen (1982), Hansen and Sargent
(1997), Stock and Onatski (1999), Giannoni (2000), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 8
rule reacts only as the inﬂationary eﬀects are realized, whereas a forecast-based rule can respond
immediately to the shock and hence get a head start in restraining its inﬂationary eﬀects.
In this paper, we analyze the performance of monetary policy rules using ﬁve models of the
U.S. economy. The small stylized model (described further in Section 3) has no intrinsic inertia,
while each of the four macroeconometric models incorporates nontrivial monetary transmission
lags. In particular, the Fuhrer-Moore (FM) model exhibits the highest degree of inertia with
respect to both aggregate demand and inﬂation (cf. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). In the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) model, prices and spending are subject to higher-order adjustment costs;
this model also features a relatively detailed representation of the supply side of the economy
(cf. Brayton, Mauskopf, Reifschneider, Tinsley and Williams (1997b), Reifschneider, Tetlow and
Williams (1999)). In Taylor’s (1993) multicountry model – hereafter referred to as TMCM –
prices are determined by staggered wage contracts, while consumption and investment expenditures
are explicitly forward-looking and exhibit relatively little intrinsic inertia. Finally, the Monetary
Studies Research (MSR) model developed by Orphanides and Wieland (1998) exhibits output
dynamics similar to that of TMCM and inﬂation dynamics similar to that of the FM model.
To compare the properties of these models, we utilize an estimated federal funds rate equation
as a benchmark policy rule (henceforth referred to as rule A). In particular, using U.S. quarterly
data for the period 1980:1-1998:4, we estimated the following equation via two-stage least squares:











where i denotes the short-term nominal interest rate; y denotes the output gap (the deviation of
output from potential), and ˜ π denotes the four-quarter average inﬂation rate of the chain-weighted
GDP price deﬂator.9 All variables are measured at annual rates in percentage points, and the
standard error of each regression coeﬃcient is given in parentheses. Using this benchmark policy
rule, we solve each model using the methodology described in the Appendix, and then determine
its behavior in response to a 100 basis point federal funds rate innovation.
Based on the dynamic behavior of the four macroeconometric models, monetary transmission
lags alone can potentially rationalize policy rules that utilize output forecast horizons of up to one
year and inﬂation forecast horizons of up to two years. As shown in Figure 1, the peak response
of output occurs with a lag of one to four quarters, while the peak inﬂation response exhibits a
lag of three to nine quarters. For comparison, it is interesting to note that estimated VAR models
of the U.S. economy exhibit a monetary transmission lag of about two years for output and a lag
9The functional form of equation (1) is the same as in Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Levin et al. (1999),
but with a somewhat longer sample period. In estimating this equation, we used the quarterly average federal funds
rate, the CBO output gap series, and the inﬂation rate of the chain-weighted GDP price deﬂator. For this regression
equation, ¯ R
2 = .93 and DW = 2.50.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 9



















































































of about three years for inﬂation (cf. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), Brayton, Levin,
Tryon and Williams (1997a)).
A related argument (referred to as “information encompassing” by Batini and Haldane (1999)) is
that forecast-based policy rules can implicitly incorporate a wide variety of information regarding
the current state of the economy as well as anticipated future developments. For example, a
forecast-based rule can automatically adjust the stance of monetary policy depending on whether a
given macroeconomic disturbance is expected to persist or to vanish quickly. In contrast, a simple
outcome-based rule prescribes a ﬁxed policy response to a given movement in the inﬂation rate,
regardless of whether the underlying shock is transitory or persistent. For this reason, outcome-
based rules typically utilize smoothed measures of the inﬂation rate (e.g., the four-quarter average)
in order to dampen the monetary policy response to transitory supply shocks (cf. Williams (1999)).
Of course, using a smoothed inﬂation rate also means that outcome-based rules exhibit a more
sluggish response to persistent shocks, and hence might be expected to yield inferior stabilization
performance compared with forecast-based rules that utilize non-smoothed measures of inﬂation.
Finally, it has been argued that monetary policy can eﬀectively stabilize both inﬂation and
output through a rule that only involves inﬂation forecasts, with no explicit response to the output
gap. (Batini and Haldane (1999) refer to this feature of forecast-based rules as “output encom-
passing.”) In principle, the forecast horizon of the rule can be adjusted to reﬂect the policymaker’s
preferences for stabilizing output vs. inﬂation in response to aggregate supply shocks; that is, with
a longer inﬂation forecast horizon, the policy rule brings inﬂation back to target more gradually
and thereby dampens the associated swings in output and employment. To analyze this approach,ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 10
our analysis below includes a detailed evaluation of the performance and robustness of rules that
respond only to an inﬂation forecast and the lagged interest rate.
2.2 Forecast-Based Rules from the Literature
In light of the previous discussion, it is evident that several important issues arise in specifying
a forecast-based policy rule, including the selection of a particular forecast horizon, the use of a
high-frequency or smoothed measure of the inﬂation rate, and the choice of whether to incorporate
an explicit response to the output gap. Thus, it is useful to review the characteristics of policy
rules that have been studied in the academic literature as well as rules that are actually used for
policy analysis at central banks. For this purpose, we consider the following general speciﬁcation:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)(r∗ + Et¯ πt+θ)+α(Et¯ πt+θ − π∗)+βEtyt+κ, (2)
where r∗ is the unconditional mean of the short-term real interest rate, π∗ is the inﬂation target,
and the inﬂation measure ¯ π is either the one-quarter inﬂation rate, π, or the four-quarter average
inﬂation rate, ˜ π. The operator Et indicates the forecast of a particular variable, using information
available in period t. The integers θ and κ denote the forecast horizons (measured in quarters) for
inﬂation and the output gap, respectively.
Table 1 reports the speciﬁcations of ten forecast-based policy rules taken from the literature;
additional information about these rules is provided in the Appendix. Rules B and C were ﬁtted
to U.S. data from the past two decades. The parameters of rules D, E, F, J, and K were selected
based on favorable stabilization performance in particular macroeconomic models with rational
expectations, while the parameters of rules G, H, and I were chosen based on performance in
models with adaptive expectations. Seven of the ten rules exhibit “interest rate smoothing” or
“policy inertia”; that is, these rules involve a direct response to the lagged short-term interest rate.
As noted above, the “lag-encompassing” rationale for forecast-based rules suggests a forecast
horizon roughly similar to the transmission lag of monetary policy. To highlight this feature, the
rules in Table 1 have been grouped into two categories according to the duration of the inﬂation
forecast horizon: two to four quarters for rules B through F; and eight to ﬁfteen quarters for rules
G through K. In all cases, the inﬂation forecast horizon equals or exceeds the output forecast
horizon. The range of forecast horizons in these rules lies within the range of the estimated policy
transmission lags for the four macroeconometric models considered here as well as for estimated
VAR models of the U.S. economy.
A smoothed measure of inﬂation (namely, the four-quarter average inﬂation rate ˜ π) is utilized
in ﬁve of the rules in Table 1 (including rules B and C that were ﬁtted to U.S. data). As discussed
above, however, the “information-encompassing” rationale for forecast-based rules suggests that the
use of a smoothed measure of inﬂation might be unnecessary or even counterproductive. ConsistentECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 11
Table 1: Characteristics of Forecast-Based Rules from the Literature
General Speciﬁcation
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)(r∗ + Et¯ πt+θ)+α(Et¯ πt+θ − π∗)+βEtyt+κ
Label Source ¯ πθ κ ρ α β
Inﬂation Forecast Horizon ≤ 1y e a r
B Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) ˜ π 4 0 .84 .27 .09
C Orphanides (1998) ˜ π 4 4 .56 .27 .36
D de Brouwer & Ellis (1998) ˜ π 4 4 0 2.80 1.00
E Batini and Nelson (2001) π 2 - .98 1.26 -
F Isard, Laxton & Eliasson (1999) ˜ π 3-4 - 0 1.50 -
Inﬂation Forecast Horizon ≥ 2y e a r
G Rudebusch & Svensson (1999) π 8 - .62 1.97 -
H Rudebusch & Svensson (1999) π 12 - .71 3.57 -
I Batini & Nelson (2000) π 15 - .85 34.85 -
JAmano, Coletti & Macklem (1999) it = ib
t +3 .0(Et˜ πt+8 − π∗)
K Batini & Haldane (1999) it = Etπt+1 + .5r∗ + .5(it−1 − Et−1πt)
+.5(Etπt+8 − π∗)
Notes: The inﬂation measure ¯ π is either the one-quarter inﬂation rate π or the four-quarter average
inﬂation rate ˜ π. In rule F, the ﬁrst inﬂation forecast (multiplied by the coeﬃcient 1 − ρ)u s e sa
4-quarter horizon, while the second inﬂation forecast (multiplied by the coeﬃcient α)u s e sa3 -
quarter horizon. The ﬁnal two rules do not conform to the general speciﬁcation: rule Jinvolves
the long-term nominal interest rate ib
t, while rule K involves the lagged value of the ex ante real
interest rate, it−1 − Et−1πt.
with this view, rules E, G, H, I, and K involve forecasts of the one-quarter annualized inﬂation
rate.
Seven of the forecast-based policy rules - including all of the rules with inﬂation forecast horizons
longer than one year – do not include an explicit response to a measure of economic activity and
hence provide test cases for the “output encompassing” hypothesis described above. In contrast,
both estimated rules include positive responses to the output gap.10
10It should be noted that rule A also includes a economically and statistically signiﬁcant response to the change
in the output gap; regression analysis indicates that the same would be true in forecast-based speciﬁcations such as
those used in rules B and C. The exclusion of this term from those two rules (apparently for reasons of parsimony)
implies more passive policy responses than rule A in terms of output stabilization as well as nominal interest rate
variability.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 12
3 Indeterminacy of Rational Expectations Equilibria
Since the work of Sargent and Wallace (1975), the issue of indeterminacy has been an important
consideration in evaluating the performance of alternative policy rules: if a monetary policy rule
yields multiple stationary equilibria in a rational expectations model, then many of these equilib-
rium paths involve macroeconomic ﬂuctuations that are unrelated to economic fundamentals.11 In
particular, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) considered a small stylized model and showed that rules
utilizing a one-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecast are prone to generating multiple equilibria. In this
section, we extend their analysis to rules with longer forecast horizons, and then we analyze the
conditions for determinacy in each of the four macroeconometric models described above. These
results enable us to identify several key characteristics of robust policy rules; given these ﬁndings,
we consider which of the forecast-based rules in Table 1 generate multiple equilibria in these ﬁve
models.
3.1 Multiple Equilibria in an Optimizing AD-AS Model
We start by examining the conditions for determinacy in a small stylized model similar to that
used in Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and more recently in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999b)
and Woodford (2000a). The model consists of the following two equations along with the monetary
policy rule given in equation (2):
πt = δEtπt+1 + φyt +  t, (3)
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1 − r∗
t), (4)
where φ>0, σ>0, and 0 <δ<1. As described in the Appendix, the price-setting equation (3)
and the “expectational IS” equation (4) can be derived from the behavior of optimizing agents.
The expectational IS equation and the policy rule together can be viewed as determining aggregate
demand, while the price-setting equation determines aggregate supply. Thus, in the subsequent
discussion we refer to this three-equation model as the “optimizing AD-AS” model.
Outcome-Based Rules. For outcome-based rules in which policy responds to the current
annualized one-quarter inﬂation rate πt as well as the current output gap and lagged interest rate,





For the special case in which policy does not respond to the output gap (that is, β = 0), this restric-
tion has a very simple interpretation: a one percentage point rise in the inﬂation rate eventually
11For recent analysis of this issue, see Kerr and King (1996), Christiano and Gust (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999a), and Woodford (2000a). For a contrary view, see McCallum (1999) and McCallum (2000).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 13
elicits a greater than one percentage point rise in the nominal short-term interest rate.12 If policy
exhibits a positive response to the current output gap (that is, κ = 0 and β>0), then modestly
negative values of α are also consistent with a unique equilibrium in this model.
One-Step-Ahead Inﬂation Forecast Rules. We now consider the determinacy conditions
for forecast-based rules involving πt+1, the one-step-ahead forecast of the annualized one-quarter
inﬂation rate. In this case, policy is subject to the same lower bound as in equation (5), but now, an
additional upper bound on the allowable value of α obtains. In particular, as shown by Woodford






(2 + 2ρ + σβ). (6)
With a moderate policy response to expected inﬂation, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium;
that is, any other values of the current output gap and current inﬂation rate are associated with an
explosive path in subsequent periods. In contrast, with a suﬃciently aggressive policy response to
expected inﬂation, the output gap and inﬂation rate are projected to converge back to the steady
state regardless of their values in the current period. Thus, at any given point in time, the output
gap and inﬂation rate can suddenly move in response to random shocks that are unrelated to
economic fundamentals (often referred to as “sunspots”).
The upper bound on α in equation (6) is increasing in both ρ and β. Responding to the lagged
interest rate is equivalent to responding to the weighted sum of past and present output gaps
and one-step-ahead inﬂation forecasts. The dependence of policy on current and lagged inﬂation
strengthens the link between expected and actual inﬂation and thereby reduces the incidence of
multiple equilibria. Similarly, because the output gap is proportional to the quasi-diﬀerence between
the current and expected inﬂation rate, a positive response to the current output gap is equivalent
to raising the response to current inﬂation and reducing it on expected inﬂation, and this shift in
policy response likewise reduces the incidence of indeterminacy.
Longer-Horizon Forecast Rules. With forecast horizons of two quarters or more, analytical
descriptions of the requirements for determinacy are not easily obtained, and hence we compute
these conditions numerically. In calibrating the model, we use the parameter values given in
Woodford (2000a), simply adjusting these values to account for the fact that our variables are
expressed at annual rates.13
12Woodford (2001) refers to this condition as the “Taylor Principle.” The increase in the real interest rate dampens
aggregate demand, putting downward pressure on inﬂation. This condition for determinacy also applies to a wide
range of macroeconomic models with nominal inertia, including the four larger models considered in this paper. See
Bryant, Hooper and Mann, eds (1993), Taylor (1999b), and Levin et al. (1999). In contrast, Christiano and Gust
(1999) show that this condition is not suﬃcient to ensure determinacy in a modelwith l iquidity eﬀects of monetary
policy but no nominal inertia. See also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001).
13Thus, we set δ =0 .99, σ =1 .59, and φ =0 .096, while r
∗
t follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation
parameter 0.35 and the innovation is i.i.d. with a standard deviation of 3.72. We assume that the aggregate supply
disturbance  t is i.i.d., and calibrate its standard deviation so that the unconditional variance of inﬂation under the
benchmark rule A matches the sample variance of U.S. quarterly inﬂation over the period 1983:1-1999:4.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 14
Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria in the Optimizing AD-AS Model
Policy responds to one-quarter inflation rate
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Note: For each speciﬁcation of the inﬂation forecast horizon (2, 4, 8, 12, and 16 quarters), multiple
equilibria occur for all combinations of the parameters α and ρ that lie to the northwest of the
corresponding curve. If no curve is shown for a particular forecast horizon, then that speciﬁcation
yields determinacy for all combinations of 0 ≤ α ≤ 10 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.5.
Figure 2 shows the conditions under which a given speciﬁcation of the policy rule generates
multiple equilibria in the calibrated model. The upper two panels show results for policy rules
involving the one-quarter annualized one-quarter inﬂation rate π, while the lower two panels show
corresponding results for rules that involve the four-quarter average inﬂation rate ˜ π. In the two
panels on the left side of the ﬁgure, policy does not respond explicitly to the output gap; in the
two panels on the right, policy exhibits a moderate response to the current output gap (that is,
β = 1 and κ = 0). For each speciﬁcation of the inﬂation forecast horizon, the corresponding
curve indicates the boundary of the indeterminacy region; that is, multiple equilibria occur for allECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 15
combinations of the parameters α and ρ that lie to the northwest of the speciﬁed boundary.
It is evident from Figure 2 that the determinacy conditions for longer-horizon forecasts are
qualitatively similar to the analytic conditions discussed above for rules involving one-step-ahead
inﬂation forecasts, and are also systematically related to the choice of inﬂation measure and to the
length of the forecast horizon. For example, the upper-left panel shows that for rules involving
πt+2, no policy inertia (ρ = 0), and no response to the output gap (β = 0), indeterminacy occurs
for all positive values of α. More generally, we ﬁnd that:
• Indeterminacy occurs if the policy response to the inﬂation forecast is suﬃciently aggressive for
a given inﬂation measure and positive forecast horizon and for a given amount of policy inertia and
output responsiveness. For example, for rules involving πt+2, moderate policy inertia (ρ =0 .75),
and no response to the output gap (β = 0), indeterminacy occurs for all values of α>4.
• Determinacy can be obtained by incorporating a suﬃciently high degree of policy inertia
for any particular choice of inﬂation measure and forecast horizon and for any given degree of
responsiveness to the output gap and to the inﬂation forecast (subject, of course, to the lower-
bound α>0). For example, setting ρ = 1 is suﬃcient to ensure determinacy for any rule involving
πt+2 with 0 <α<8.
• Utilizing a longer inﬂation forecast horizon expands the region of indeterminacy for either
inﬂation measure. For example, in the upper-left panel, it is evident that setting α = 2 and ρ =1
yields determinacy for rules with a forecast horizon of two quarters but not for rules with a forecast
horizon of four quarters or longer.
• Incorporating a explicit response to the current output gap shrinks the range of values of α
and ρ that yield indeterminacy for a particular choice of inﬂation measure and forecast horizon.
For example, the upper-right panel shows that a moderate policy response to the current output
gap (β = 1) is suﬃcient to ensure determinacy for rules involving πt+2 for all values of ρ and α
considered here. While not shown here, it should be emphasized that responding to a forecast
of the future output gap (rather than to its current value) does not necessarily help in avoiding
indeterminacy, and is even counterproductive in some cases.
• Utilizing a smoothed measure of inﬂation shrinks the range of values of the policy parameters
that yield indeterminacy for a particular choice of forecast horizon. For example, the lower-left
panel shows that rules involving the two-step-ahead forecast of the four-quarter average inﬂation
rate (˜ πt+2) yield determinacy for all values of α and ρ considered here, even in the absence of any
explicit output response (β =0 ) .ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 16

























































3.2 Multiple Equilibria in the Four Macroeconometric Models
The preceding analysis has focused exclusively on the optimizing AD-AS model, in which output
and inﬂation are “jump” variables with no intrinsic inertia.14 Now we consider the incidence
of indeterminacy in the four macroeconometric models; as noted above, each of these models
incorporates rational expectations and exhibits non-negligible persistence of output and inﬂation.
A measure of the degree of intrinsic persistence in the four models is provided by Figure 3,
which shows the unconditional autocorrelations of inﬂation and the output gap.15 For these com-
putations, we assume monetary policy follows the benchmark policy rule A given in equation (1).
Consistent with the verbal description in the previous section (and the more detailed discussion
in the Appendix), inﬂation is highly persistent in the FM and MSR models and far less so in the
FRB and TMCM models; the output gap is also much more persistent in the FM model than in
the other three macroeconometric models.
Now we follow the same approach as in the previous subsection in analyzing the conditions on
forecast-based rules that are required to obtain determinacy in each model. We ﬁnd that the FM
model is relatively immune to indeterminacy problems: even with a forecast horizon of 16 quarters
and no explicit response to the output gap, all combinations of 0 <α≤ 10 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.5a r e
14Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Estrella and Fuhrer (1998) have criticized this lack of intrinsic inertia as being at
odds with the data. For other views on this issue, see the published discussions of Fuhrer (1997b) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), as well as the recent analysis of Erceg and Levin (2000).
15Autocorrelations provide a reasonable measure of intrinsic persistence for these four models because nearly all
the shocks used for computing unconditional moments are serially uncorrelated; the only exceptions are the term
premium shocks for certain ﬁnancialvariabl es in FRB and TMCM.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 17




































































































































































































Note: See Figure 2.
consistent with a unique rational expectations equilibrium. This result follows directly from the
highly persistent nature of output and inﬂation in the FM model, because this persistence implies a
close correspondence between the current inﬂation rate and its expected value several years hence.
In contrast, the determinacy conditions for the FRB, MSR and TMCM models are qualita-
tively similar to those of the small stylized model; quantitatively, these conditions depend on the
speciﬁc output and price dynamics of each model. In particular, Figure 4 shows the indeterminacy
boundaries for forecast-based rules that utilize the four-quarter average inﬂation rate and that do
not respond directly to the output gap. For purposes of comparison with the optimizing AD-AS
model, the relevant panel from Figure 2 is shown again here.
As in the previous analysis, we ﬁnd that the indeterminacy region expands with the length ofECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 18


























































































































































































Note: See Figure 2.
the inﬂation forecast horizon and that the incidence of indeterminacy shrinks with the degree of
interest rate smoothing. For example, in three of the macroeconometric models, as in the optimizing
AD-AS model, an inﬂation forecast horizon of 16 quarters generates multiple equilibria for virtually
all combinations of 0 <α≤ 10 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. For rules involving a four-quarter inﬂation forecast
horizon, determinacy occurs in the MSR and TMCM models for all combinations of α and ρ shown
in the ﬁgure; in the FRB model, ρ>0.75 is suﬃcient to ensure determinacy for all 0 <α≤ 10.16
Allowing for a moderate response to the current output gap shrinks the region of indeterminacy
in each macroeconometric model. Figure 5 shows the indeterminacy boundaries for rules with a
16Although not shown in Figures 4 and 5, indeterminacy arises in each of the macroeconometric models if α is very
close to zero, especially with long forecast horizons; this lower bound is typically on the order of 0.1.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 19
unit coeﬃcient on the current output gap (that is, β =1 ) . 17 With this output response, rules that
utilize an four-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon yield a unique equilibrium in every model for every
combination of 0 <α≤ 8a n d0≤ ρ ≤ 1.5. Finally, while not shown here, we have also computed
indeterminacy regions for each of the four macroeconometric models for policy rules that involve
the annualized one-quarter inﬂation rate π instead of the annual average inﬂation rate ˜ π; as in the
previous subsection, we ﬁnd that using the smoothed inﬂation measure shrinks the indeterminacy
region in each model (especially for shorter forecast horizons).
3.3 Behavior of Forecast-Based Rules from the Literature
Now we examine how the forecast-based rules given in Table 1 fare in terms of determinacy. Our
analysis has highlighted several key characteristics of rules that yield a unique equilibrium in every
model: a relatively short inﬂation forecast horizon; a smoothed measure of inﬂation (that is, the
four-quarter average rather than the annualized one-quarter rate); a moderate degree of responsive-
ness to the inﬂation forecast (0 <α<5); an explicit response to the current output gap (β>0);
and a substantial degree of policy inertia (ρ ≥ 0.5). Thus, the ﬁrst ﬁve columns of Table 2 indicate
the extent to which each rule exhibits these properties, while each of the remaining columns indi-
cate whether the rule generates multiple equilibria (“ME”) or determinacy (“–”) in the speciﬁed
model. As shown in the ﬁrst row of the table, the benchmark outcome-based rule A satisﬁes the
lower bound α>0, and hence yields a unique stationary equilibrium in all ﬁve models.
Among the forecast-based policy rules, it is striking that only rules B and E yield determinacy
in every model. Rule B possesses all the characteristics supportive of determinacy, including the
use of a smoothed measure of inﬂation, a four-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon, a positive output
gap response, and a substantial degree of policy inertia. While rule E does not respond explicitly
to the output gap, this rule does incorporate a high degree of policy inertia and utilizes a short
inﬂation forecast horizon of only two quarters.
Rules C and D generate multiple equilibria in the optimizing AD-AS model but not in any of
the macroeconometric models. Compared with rule B, the degree of policy inertia is much lower for
rule C and is completely absent from rule D. These two rules also diﬀer from rule B in responding
to the four-quarter-ahead forecast of the output gap rather than to its current value. Given the
absence of intrinsic output and inﬂation inertia in the optimizing AD-AS model, responding to
the one-year-ahead projected output gap does not contribute toward ensuring determinacy in this
model, whereas such a response does facilitate determinacy in each of the four macroeconometric
models. We will return to this issue in Section 5.3 when we consider the stabilization performance
of rules involving output gap forecasts.
Rules F, G, H, I, J, and K generate multiple equilibria in the optimizing AD-AS model and
17We have explored these indeterminacy regions for other values of β and obtained qualitatively similar results.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 20
Table 2: Determinacy of Rules from the Literature
Rule Policy Rule Characteristics Model
Inﬂation Smoothed
Forecast Inﬂation αβρ Opt.
Horizon Measure AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
A 0 X . 4. 2. 8 – – – – –
B 4 X . 3. 1. 8 – – – – –
C 4 X . 3. 4. 6 M E – – – –
D4 X 2 . 8 1 . 0 – M E – – – –
E 2 – 1.3 – 1.0 – – – – –
F 3–4 X 1.5 – – ME – ME – –
G 8 – 2.0 – .6 ME – ME ME –
H1 2 –3 . 6 – . 7 M E – M E M E –
I 15 – 34.8 – .8 ME ME ME ME ME
J8 X 3 . 0–– M E –M E M E M E
K8 – 0 . 5 – . 5 M E – M E – –
Notes: In the column labelled “Smoothed Inﬂation Measure”, “X” signiﬁes that the rule utilizes
the four-quarter average inﬂation rate, while “–” indicates that the rule utilizes the one-quarter
annualized inﬂation rate. In the last ﬁve columns, “ME” signiﬁes that the rule yields multiple
equilibria in the speciﬁed model, while “–” indicates that the rule yields a unique stationary equi-
librium.
in at least one of the macroeconometric models. It is notable that none of these rules includes an
explicit response to the output gap. Furthermore, ﬁve of the six rules utilize an inﬂation forecast
horizon of at least eight quarters; the exception is rule F, which has a shorter forecast horizon but
suﬀers from a complete lack of policy inertia. Finally, rule I is unique in generating indeterminacy
in the FM model, which has the greatest degree of intrinsic inertia among the models considered
here; this outcome occurs because rule I utilizes a forecast horizon of nearly four years along with
an exceptionally high value of α =3 4 .8 (far outside the range considered in the preceding ﬁgures).
These results indicate that the issue of indeterminacy is relevant not only in small “stylized”
models but also in macroeconometric models that exhibit a higher degree of inﬂation and output
persistence. In particular, a number of policy rules proposed in the literature fail to ensure a unique
stationary equilibrium in at least one of the four macroeconometric models considered here. Thus,
the characteristics listed above are crucial in identifying forecast-based rules that are likely to be
robust to model uncertainty.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 21
4 Optimized Forecast-Based Rules
In this section, we investigate the characteristics of optimized forecast-based rules. In light of
the results of the previous section, we restrict our attention to rules that yield a unique rational
expectations equilibrium in the speciﬁed model.18 For a given model and a speciﬁc form of the policy
rule, we determine the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons and coeﬃcients that minimize a
weighted average of inﬂation variability and output gap variability, subject to an upper bound on
interest rate variability.
4.1 The Optimization Problem
We assume that the policymaker’s loss function L has the form
L = Va r(π)+λV ar(y), (7)
where Va r(.) denotes the unconditional variance and the weight λ ≥ 0 indicates the policymaker’s
preference for reducing output variability relative to inﬂation variability. For example, λ =1 /3
may be viewed as representing a policymaker who is primarily concerned with stabilizing inﬂation
but who also places some weight on stabilizing the output gap, whereas λ = 0 represents a
policymaker whose sole objective is to minimize inﬂation variability (that is, an “inﬂation nutter”
in the terminology of King (1997)). For a given value of λ and a particular functional form of
the policy rule, the parameters of the rule are chosen to minimize the loss function L subject to
an upper bound on the volatility of changes in the short-term nominal interest rate; that is, the
unconditional standard deviation of ∆it cannot exceed a speciﬁed value σ∆i.
Henceforth we consider linear policy rules of the general form given by equation (2).19 As in
the previous section, we consider two alternatives for the inﬂation measure ¯ π. When the policy
rule utilizes the annualized one-quarter inﬂation rate, π, we refer to this speciﬁcation as the class
of FB1 rules. When the rule utilizes the four-quarter average inﬂation rate, ˜ π, we refer to this
speciﬁcation as the class of FB4 rules. We also consider the more restricted class of FB4XG rules
that exclude an explicit output gap response (that is, β ≡ 0). Finally, we refer to outcome-based
rules (in which the forecast horizons θ = κ = 0) as the class of OB rules.
18In nearly all cases, this restriction is not binding in the sense that the optimal rules we consider are well away
from the regions of indeterminacy. In the few cases where the constraint is binding, we make note of that fact.
19Given the assumption of a quadratic objective function and the linear structure of each model, the restriction
to linear rules is innocuous and greatly facilitates computation. More generally, non-quadratic preferences or model
nonlinearities give rise to nonlinear optimal policy rules (cf. Orphanides and Wilcox (1996), Orphanides, Small,
Wieland and Wilcox (1997), Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999)). For example, explicit inﬂation-targeting regimes
typically are implemented with respect to a target zone rather than a speciﬁc target point, implying a nonlinear
policy response (Orphanides and Wieland (1999), Tetlow (2000)). Furthermore, the presence of the non-negativity
constraint on nominal interest rates directly imposes a nonlinearity to the policy rule (Fuhrer and Madigan (1997),
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Wolman (1998), Reifschneider and Williams (2000)). In the present paper, we do
not investigate the extent to which nonlinear policy rules are sensitive to model uncertainty, but rather leave this
issue for future research.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 22
All ﬁve models considered in this paper exhibit a tradeoﬀ between inﬂation-output variability
and interest rate variability, except at very high levels of interest rate variability.20 Figure 6 illus-
trates this tradeoﬀ for the four macroeconometric models for three values of the policy preference
parameter λ. In particular, for each model, we consider the set of OB rules of the form given by
equation (2) for which the coeﬃcients ρ, α,a n dβ are chosen optimally given that the forecast
horizons θ = κ = 0. For a speciﬁc value of λ, each point on the corresponding curve indicates the
minimized value of the loss function L for a particular value of σ∆i. The vertical line in each panel
indicates the standard deviation of interest rate changes associated with the benchmark estimated
rule A; this value varies noticeably across the four models, mainly due to the use of a diﬀerent
sample period in estimating the parameters and the innovation covariance matrix of each model
(cf. Appendix Table A1).21
From Figure 6 it is evident that stabilization performance deteriorates rapidly if interest rate
volatility is constrained to be much lower than that induced by rule A (which was estimated over the
period 1980-1998). On the other hand, stabilization performance cannot be substantially improved
even if interest rate volatility is permitted to be much higher than that induced by rule A (unless
the policymaker places implausibly high weight on output volatility).22 Therefore, we focus our
attention on policy rules for which the parameters are chosen to minimize the loss function L
subject to the constraint that interest rate volatility cannot exceed that of rule A.
4.2 Characteristics of Optimized Rules
We now analyze the optimal choices of forecast horizons and policy rule coeﬃcients for each model
for a range of values of the preference parameter λ. In particular, we consider a relatively large
grid of possible combinations of inﬂation and output forecast horizons. For each point on this grid,
we compute the values of the policy rule coeﬃcients that minimize the loss function L subject to
the speciﬁed upper bound on interest rate volatility. Finally, we compare the resulting values of
L across the forecast horizon grid to determine the optimal combination of inﬂation and output
forecast horizons. We only consider forecast horizons up to 20 quarters for both the inﬂation rate
and the output gap; however, this constraint binds only in one case noted below.
For each model and each value of λ, the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 indicate the optimal
values of θ and κ for the class of FB4 rules and the percent change in the loss function – denoted
20This tradeoﬀ is characteristic of many macroeconomic models in the recent literature; cf. the papers in Taylor,
ed (1999), and further discussion in Sack and Wieland (2000).
21In evaluating the performance of rule A, we set its innovation variance to zero.
22We also note that a linear policy rule which induces highly variable nominal interest rates may not be im-
plementable in practice, because such a rule will prescribe frequent (and occasionally large) violations of the non-
negativity constraint on the federal funds rate (cf. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). In principle, we could analyze
nonlinear rules that incorporate this non-negativity constraint (see Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Reifschneider
and Williams (2000), and Wolman (1998)), but doing so would substantially increase the computational costs of our
analysis.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 23
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Note: The vertical dash-dot line indicates the value of σ∆i generated by the benchmark rule A.
%∆L – relative to the optimized OB rule. Note that %∆L is always non-positive for FB4 rules
because the class of OB rules (for which θ = κ = 0) is nested within the class of FB4 rules. The
remaining columns of the table indicate the corresponding results for the class of FB1 rules and
for the class of FB4XG rules. (The coeﬃcients ρ, α,a n dβ of each optimized rule are reported in
Appendix Table A2.)
The ﬁrst notable result in Table 3 is that the optimal inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons
are generally very short for FB4 rules. In the optimizing AD-AS model, outcome-based rules
(with θ = κ = 0) generally outperform rules with any positive forecast horizon. This result may
not be surprising given the lack of intrinsic inertia in this model. Nevertheless, even in the four
macroeconometric models, the optimal forecast horizons never exceed four quarters. When the
policymaker’s loss function involves both inﬂation variability and output gap variability (that is,
when λ>0), the optimal values of θ and κ are only 0-2 quarters in the FRB, MSR and TMCMECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 24
Table 3: Optimal Forecast Horizons and Stabilization Performance
FB4 Rules FB1 Rules FB4XG Rules
Model λθ κ %∆L θκ%∆L θκ %∆L
0 0 1 -20 0 0 18 0 - 0
Opt. 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 - 734
AD-AS 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 - 2721
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 - 3216
01 0- 0 0 0 0 9 - 1
FM 1/3 0 4 -1 0 7 0 18 - 2
1 0 4 -1 0 7 0 18 - 11
3 0 4 -1 0 7 1 20 - 30
0 4 1 -10 2 0 -9 4 - -10
FRB 1/3 0 2 -5 1 3 -4 7 - 167
1 0 2 -7 1 3 -6 8 - 407
3 0 2 -9 1 3 -8 8 - 793
00 0 0 0 0 7 0 - 0
MSR 1/3 0 1 -3 1 1 3 5 - 117
1 0 1 -3 1 1 2 4 - 195
3 0 1 -1 1 1 1 4 - 295
02 0- 4 1 1- 4 3 -- 4
TMCM 1/3 2 0 -0 1 0 -0 3 - 24
11 1- 0 1 0- 0 3 -5 5
31 1- 1 1 1- 1 6 -8 7
Notes: For each model, each value of the preference parameter λ, and each speciﬁcation of the
policy rule, this table indicates the optimal inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ)a n d
the percentage point change in the policymaker’s loss function (%∆L) compared with the optimized
outcome-based (OB) rule (for which θ ≡ κ ≡ 0). FB4 rules utilize the four-quarter average inﬂation
rate ˜ π, while FB1 rules utilize the one-quarter annualized inﬂation rate π; FB4XG rules have no
explicit response to the output gap (β ≡ 0).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 25
models; for the FM model, the optimal horizons are θ = 0 and κ =4 .
The optimal forecast horizons for FB1 rules are somewhat longer, especially for the FM model
(where κ = 7 when λ>0). The optimal inﬂation forecast horizon are also longer for FB4XG rules,
and in some cases, markedly so. For example, with λ = 1, the optimal inﬂation forecast horizon is
8 quarters for the FRB model and 18 quarters for the FM model.23
A second striking result in Table 3 is that forecast-based rules never yield dramatic improve-
ments in stabilization performance compared with that of simple outcome-based rules. For FB4
rules, the reduction in the policymaker’s loss function never exceeds 20 percent, and is less than
5 percent for all values of λ in three of the models (FM, MSR, and TMCM). Furthermore, these
results do not depend on the choice of inﬂation measure: in fact, FB1 rules typically perform
slightly worse than FB4 rules. Finally, although not shown in the table, we have conﬁrmed that
these results are not sensitive to the particular choice of upper bound on interest rate variability.24
Evidently, some of the purported advantages of forecast-based rules (such as “lag encompassing”
and “information encompassing”) are quantitatively unimportant, even in rational expectations
models with substantial transmission lags and complex dynamic properties. These results are
consistent with those of Levin et al. (1999), who found that fairly complicated outcome-based rules
(which respond to a large number of observable state variables) yield only small stabilization gains
over simple outcome-based rules. It is also interesting to note that Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
found similar results in a small macroeconometric model with adaptive expectations: although
the Rudebusch-Svensson model includes a dozen state variables, the current output gap and four-
quarter average inﬂation rate essentially serve as suﬃcient statistics for monetary policy, and hence
forecast-based rules provide minimal stabilization gains even in that model.
Finally, it has been argued that a rule which responds exclusively to the inﬂation forecast (with
a suitable choice of forecast horizon) can be eﬀective at stabilizing both output and inﬂation, even
without an explicit response to the output gap. As shown in the ﬁnal column of Table 3, FB4XG
rules do perform as well as the more general FB4 rules when the policymaker’s objective function
places no weight on output gap variability (λ = 0). However, when the policymaker’s loss function
places non-trivial weight on output gap variability, then excluding the output gap from the policy
rule can cause a severe deterioration in stabilization performance. For example, when λ =1 /3,
FB4XG rules generate excess losses (compared with OB rules) of over 100 percent in the FRB and
MSR models and over 700 percent in the optimizing AD-AS model. Thus, “output encompassing”
is not a general characteristic of inﬂation forecast rules.25
23As noted above, we restricted our search to forecast horizons up to 20 quarters; this bound is only reached in
one case, namely, the inﬂation forecast horizon for the FM model when λ =3 .
24We have repeated the analysis described above using an upper bound σ∆i that is twice as large as the value
associated with rule A. Relaxing this constraint yields small improvements in stabilization performance, but the
relative performance of forecast-based to outcome-based policy rules does not change signiﬁcantly.
25Our analysis assumes that the output gap is known in real time, whereas in practice the output gap may beECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 26
5 Robustness of Optimized Rules under Model Uncertainty
Now we analyze the extent to which optimized forecast-based rules are robust to model uncertainty.
As we have seen, the optimal forecast horizons are only 0-1 quarters for FB4 rules in the optimizing
AD-AS model. In this section, therefore, we focus our attention on the properties of the optimized
forecast-based rules taken from each of the four macroeconometric models (FM, FRB, MSR, and
TMCM). Our approach is to assume that the parameters of the policy rule are optimized based
on one of the four macroeconometric models, whereas the true economy is described by a diﬀerent
model; that is, the model used for choosing the policy rule is misspeciﬁed.
In the context of forecast-based policies, we need to make a further assumption regarding how
expectations are formed in implementing the policy rule. First, we consider the “model consistent”
case in which the policymaker’s forecasts are based on the true model; that is, the forecasts are
unbiased and eﬃcient. Next, we consider the “model inconsistent” case in which the forecasts are
constructed from the same misspeciﬁed model that has been used for determining the parameters
of the policy rule. In the ﬁrst case, macroeconomic performance suﬀers because of the suboptimal
choice of policy rule parameters; in the second case, systematic forecast errors are added to the
problem. While we could consider other variants on model-inconsistent forecasts (such as generating
forecasts from a VAR model), we believe that such variants would not substantially change the
results reported here.
Our basic method for evaluating robustness is the same for both cases of forecast generation.
For a given value of the policy preference parameter λ,w et a k eag i v e nr u l eXt h a th a sb e e n
optimized for a speciﬁc model – referred to as the “rule-generating” model – and we simulate rule
X in a diﬀerent model – referred to as the “true economy” model. If rule X generates a unique
rational expectations equilibrium, then we compute its loss function L (using the speciﬁed value of
λ). Now we evaluate the robustness of rule X by comparing its performance with the appropriate
outcome-based (OB) policy frontier of the true economy model. Thus, we ﬁnd the OB policy rule
Y that has been optimized for the true economy model subject to the constraint that its interest
rate volatility (σ∆i) cannot exceed that implied by rule X. Finally, we compute %∆L, the relative
deviation (in percentage points) of the loss function value of rule X from that of rule Y, that is,
%∆L measures the relative distance of the loss function of rule X from the relevant OB policy
frontier in Figure 6.
subject to persistent measurement errors (cf. Orphanides (1998a)). Still, the existence of output gap mismeasurement
does not imply that policy should completely exclude a response to the output gap. In a linear-quadratic framework
with symmetric information, the optimalresponse to the eﬃcent output gap estimate is invariant to the degree of
mismeasurement (cf. Svensson and Woodford (2000)). For simple outcome-based rules, output gap mismeasurement
does imply some attenuation – but not complete elimination – of the output gap response (Smets (1999), Orphanides
(1998b), Swanson (2000), Orphanides, Finan, Porter, Reifschneider and Tetlow (2000)).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 27
5.1 Robustness with Model-Consistent Forecasts
In this subsection, we assume that the policy rule is optimized using a misspeciﬁed model, but the
central bank uses model-consistent forecasts of inﬂation and output; that is, these forecasts are
formulated using the true model of the economy with the actual policy rule in operation. This
exercise might be motivated as follows. Suppose that a policymaker develops a forecast-based
rule that is optimal in the particular modeling framework that the policymaker prefers to use for
this purpose; unfortunately, this model is an imperfect representation of the true economy. The
policymaker decides to use the optimized rule to implement monetary policy and communicates
this intention to the central bank staﬀ. In implementing the policy rule, the policymaker is willing
to use forecasts that are generated using the staﬀ’s macroeconometric model; coincidentally, this
model happens to be the correct representation of the true economy. In the following section we
consider the case in which the central bank staﬀ generates its forecasts using the same (misspeciﬁed)
model that the policymaker used in choosing the policy rule.26
Table 4 reports on the robustness to model uncertainty of each class of policy rules. In the top
half of the table, the ﬁrst three columns indicate the degree of robustness of rules that have been
optimized for the FM model, while the last three columns indicate the performance of rules that
have been optimized for the FRB model. In the lower half of the table, the ﬁrst three columns refer
to rules optimized for the MSR model, while the ﬁnal three columns refer to rules optimized for
the TMCM model.
One striking result in Table 4 is that optimized FB4 rules are remarkably robust to model
uncertainty. For example, all of the optimized FB4 rules from the other models lie very close to
the OB policy frontier of the TMCM model; in fact, in a few cases, an optimized FB4 rule from
another model slightly outperforms the OB rule that is optimized for TMCM. In all cases in all
four models, the relative loss from using an optimized FB4 rule never exceeds 70 percent.
In most cases, optimized FB1 rules utilize forecast horizons similar to those of optimized FB4
rules (namely, 0-4 quarters) and yield fairly similar robustness results. The notable exception is the
set of FB1 rules optimized for the FM model with λ>0: each of these rules involves a substantially
longer output gap forecast horizon of 7 quarters. Two of these rules yield indeterminacy in the MSR
model, while the third yields a relative loss of over 90 percent; these rules also perform relatively
poorly in the FRB and TMCM models.
Finally, Table 4 shows that optimized FB4XG rules are subject to disastrous performance in
the face of model uncertainty. Apart from the case of λ = 0 (for which FB4XG rules are virtually
26We do not analyze the performance of rules involving forecasts based on an exogenous or unchanged path for
the nominalinterest rate; such an approach has been studied by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). Whil e constant-
interest-rate forecasts can serve to highlight the risks associated with policy inaction, such forecasts ignore relevant
information on the central bank’s systematic future policy response, and are particularly problematic in rational
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Table 4: Robustness of Optimized Rules with Model-Consistent Forecasts
Policy Rule Optimized for FM Optimized for FRB
Speciﬁcation λ FRB MSR TMCM FM MSR TMCM
0 7 40 -0 65 16 -2
FB4 1/3 5 27 12 6 2 2
1 9 41 11 9 5 0
3 16 57 9 14 9 -1
0 12 54 5 56 22 -1
FB1 1/3 23 91 54 9 8 3
13 7 M E 8 6 1 0 1 4 4
34 2 M E 7 0 1 3 2 0 3
0 6 13 23 65 16 -2
FB4XG 1/3 ME ME ME 44 121 20
1 ME ME ME 109 ME 32
3 ME ME ME 253 ME 42
Policy Rule Optimized for MSR Optimized for TMCM
Speciﬁcation λ FM FRB TMCM FM FRB MSR
02 0 54 1 5 - 3 1 3
FB4 1/3 27 -0 5 22 17 20
1 29 -4 3 42 4 19
3 38 -4 0 49 -1 4
0 23 13 6 39 -6 22
FB1 1/3 34 4 2 9 6 11
1 3 73 2 1 86 1 6
3 46 -1 0 72 6 21
02 8 64 4 7 - 6 1 4
FB4XG 1/3 11 ME 83 48 179 204
1 35 ME 176 89 493 331
3 84 ME 323 198 ME ME
Note: For each speciﬁcation of the policy rule (see notes to Table 3) and each value of the preference
parameter λ, the optimized rule is taken from the speciﬁed “rule-generating” model, and then this
rule is evaluated in each alternative “true economy” model using model-consistent forecasts. The
notation “ME” indicates that the rule yields multiple equilibria; otherwise, the entry indicates the
percent deviation of the loss function from the outcome-based policy frontier of the true economy
model (%∆L).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 29
indistinguishable from unrestricted FB4 rules), these rules almost uniformly generate very high
losses or indeterminacy (which we interpret as an arbitrarily high value of the loss function). For
example, the FB4XG rules optimized for TMCM with λ =1 /3 yield losses exceeding 150 percent
in FRB and MSR, while all of the FB4XG rules optimized for the FM model with λ>0 generate
multiple equilibria in all three of the other models. These results follow directly from the speciﬁc
characteristics of optimized FB4XG rules: when λ>0, these rules involve relatively little interest
rate smoothing, a highly aggressive response to a relatively long-horizon inﬂation forecast, and,
by assumption, no explicit response to the output gap. As we pointed out in Section 3, these
characteristics are exactly the ones that tend to result in indeterminacy, especially in models like
MSR and TMCM that have a relatively low degree of intrinsic inertia.
5.2 Robustness with Model-Inconsistent Forecasts
Now we investigate the consequences of using model-inconsistent forecasts; that is, we assume that
the policy rule is optimized using a misspeciﬁed model, and that the rule is then implemented using
forecasts generated by the same misspeciﬁed model. After determining the optimized policy rule
for a particular model, we obtain the reduced-form representations of the relevant inﬂation and
output gap forecasts in terms of the state variables of the model, and we add these reduced-form
forecast equations to the model of the true economy. The policy rule is expressed in terms of
the misspeciﬁed forecasts, which are obtained by evaluating these reduced-form forecast equations
using the data generated by the true economy model. Thus, this procedure presumes that the
state variables from the policymaker’s model also appear in the true economy model; that is, the
misspeciﬁed model is nested within the true economy model. For this reason, we consider cases
in which the FM model constitutes the policymaker’s model while one of the other three models
represents the true economy, and we also consider cases in which the MSR model constitutes the
policymaker’s model while either FRB or TMCM represents the true economy.
The results of this exercise are reported in the upper part of Table 5. As in the preceding
subsection, we evaluate the relative performance (%∆L) of each policy rule compared with the
optimized outcome-based rule that generates the same level of interest rate volatility in the true
economy model. Comparing these results regarding the robustness of forecast-based rules with the
outcomes presented previously in Table 4 (repeated in the lower part of Table 5), we ﬁnd that in
most cases performance deteriorates when the model-inconsistent forecast is used, especially in the
case of rules optimized in the MSR model and evaluated in the FRB or TMCM models. However,
there are exceptions to this pattern, for example in the case of rules optimized in the FM model
and evaluated in the MSR model. Overall the magnitude of the diﬀerence in loss compared to the
optimized OB rule is not very large and never exceeds 50 percent.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 30
Table 5: Implications of Model-Inconsistent Forecasts
Optimized for FM Optimized for MSR
λ FRB MSR TMCM FRB TMCM
01 4 3 95 4-
Model-inconsistent 1/3 6 14 9 3 14
forecasts 1 14 19 15 11 32
3 2 5 2 52 2 2 14 5
0 7 40 -0 5 4
Model-consistent 1/3 5 27 12 -0 5
forecasts 1 9 41 11 -4 3
36 5 7 9 - 4 0
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the optimized FB4 rule is taken from the
speciﬁed “rule-generating” model (either FM or MSR), and then this rule is evaluated in each
alternative “true economy” model. In the upper panel, the rule is implemented using forecasts
obtained from the rule-generating model; in the lower panel, the rule is implemented using forecasts
obtained from the true economy model (as in Table 4). Each entry indicates the percent deviation
of the loss function from the outcome-based policy frontier of the true economy model (%∆L).
5.3 Rules with Fixed Forecast Horizons
We have seen that optimized FB4 rules involve relatively short forecast horizons (0-4 quarters) and
are remarkably robust to model uncertainty. Now we consider the degree of robustness of rules
with longer forecast horizons. In particular, we analyze the performance of FB4 rules in which the
inﬂation forecast horizon is ﬁxed at either one or two years (that is, θ = 4 or 8), and that respond
either to the current output gap or to its one-year-ahead forecast (that is, κ = 0 or 4).
For a given value of λ and a given combination of the output and inﬂation forecast horizons, we
determine the optimal policy rule parameters (ρ, α,a n dβ) for each of the four macroeconometric
models, using the methods described in Section 4. Then we evaluate the performance of the rule in
each of the other models, following the methodology described above. For brevity, we focus on the
robustness of these rules in the optimizing AD-AS model using model-consistent forecasts. Table 6
indicates the relative loss of each rule (%∆L) compared with the OB policy frontier.27
Forecast-based rules that respond to a four-quarter inﬂation forecast and the current output
gap are generally quite robust to model uncertainty, especially when the policymaker places non-
negligible weight on stabilizing output as well as inﬂation (λ>0). In contrast, optimized rules with
27The coeﬃcients of each optimized ﬁxed-horizon rule are reported in Appendix Table A3. The robustness of
these rules in the four macroeconometric models is reported in Tables A4 and A5 for model-consistent and model-
inconsistent forecasts, respectively. In the MSR and TMCM models, the optimized rules obtained for θ = κ =4
lie right on the edge of the indeterminacy region. For the set of rules that yield a unique stationary equilibrium,
the optimum is obtained by rules that generate less interest rate variability than rule A; this is the only case in our
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Table 6: Robustness of Fixed-Horizon FB4 Rules in the Optimizing AD-AS Model
Forecast
Horizons Rule-Generating Model
θκ λ FM FRB MSR TMCM
4 0 0 210 191 ME 216
1/3 26 13 10 12
13 41 0 8 1 3
33 81 11 0 1 6
80 0 M E M E M E M E
1/3 10 12 9 ME
13 1 9 7 1 1
32 51 1 9 1 4
4 4 0 194 204 ME 221
1/3 ME ME ME ME
1M EM EM E M E
3M EM EM E M E
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ and each choice of the inﬂation forecast horizon
θ and output gap forecast horizon κ, the coeﬃcients of the rule are optimized using the speciﬁed
“rule-generating” model, and then this rule is evaluated in the optimizing AD-AS model using
model-consistent forecasts. Each entry indicates the percent deviation of the loss function from the
outcome-based policy frontier of the optimizing AD-AS model (%∆L); the notation “ME” indicates
that the rule yields multiple equilibria.
an eight-quarter inﬂation forecast horizon or a four-quarter output gap forecast are markedly less
robust, including a much greater incidence of multiple equilibria. This lack of robustness primarily
reﬂects the substantial diﬀerences in output and inﬂation dynamics across the various models.
6 Identifying a Robust Benchmark Rule
Our previous analysis has highlighted the general characteristics of forecast-based rules that are
robust to model uncertainty; in this section, we proceed to identify a speciﬁc rule that can serve
as a robust benchmark for monetary policy. None of the rules taken from the literature (listed in
Table 1) is satisfactory for this purpose: most of those rules generate indeterminacy in one or more
of the ﬁve models (see Table 2), while the remaining rules perform quite poorly relative to the
outcome-based policy frontier (see Appendix Table A6). Therefore, for each value of the preference
parameter λ, we now determine the policy rule that minimizes the average loss function across all
ﬁve models, subject to an upper bound on the level of interest rate volatility in each model.
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Table 7: Minimizing the Average Loss Across All Five Models
Optimal Parameters Stabilization Performance (%∆L)
λρ α β Opt. AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
0 1.02 0.66 0.08 139 1 0 42 1
1/3 0.97 0.45 0.41 19 9 9 15 1
1 0.92 0.30 0.53 23 7 14 15 1
3 0.89 0.19 0.60 29 4 22 18 4
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the corresponding row of this table indicates
the parameters and stabilization performance of the optimal FB4 rule (with ﬁxed forecast horizons
θ = 4 and κ = 0) that minimizes the average loss function L across all ﬁve models, subject to the
constraint that in every model the unconditional standard deviation of ∆it cannot exceed the value
generated by the estimated rule A. The stabilization performance in each model is measured by
the percent deviation of the loss function from the OB policy frontier of that model (%∆L).
where Li is the value of the loss function (7) obtained by evaluating a particular policy rule in
model i. Thus, from a Bayesian perspective, L corresponds to the expected loss function when the
policymaker has ﬂat prior beliefs regarding which of these ﬁve models is the correct representation
of the economy.
In light of our earlier results, we focus exclusively on the class of rules that respond to the one-
year-ahead forecast of the smoothed inﬂation rate and to the current output gap (that is, FB4 rules
with θ = 4 and κ = 0). Thus, for a given value of λ, we ﬁnd the values of the policy parameters
(α, β,a n dρ) that minimize L, subject to the constraint that in every model the unconditional
standard deviation of ∆it cannot exceed the value generated by the estimated rule A. The results
of this optimization are reported in Table 7.
For a policymaker who is concerned solely with stabilizing inﬂation (λ = 0), the optimized rule
works very well in several of the macroeconometric models but performs poorly in the optimizing
AD-AS model. In this case, it is apparent that no single rule is near-optimal in all ﬁve models.
Thus, the rule given in Table 7 is the optimal choice for a policymaker with ﬂat priors concerning
the relative accuracy of the ﬁve models, and would also be nearly optimal for any policymaker who
has reasonable conﬁdence in the four macroeconometric models and is relatively skeptical about
the accuracy of the optimizing AD-AS model. In contrast, this rule would be far from optimal for a
policymaker who discounts the relevance of the four macroeconometric models and who has strong
prior beliefs that the optimizing AD-AS model is the best representation of the true economy.
In contrast, for a policymaker who is concerned with stabilizing both inﬂation and the output
gap (λ>0), we ﬁnd that each optimized rule performs remarkably well in all ﬁve models, especially
considering the dramatically diﬀerent dynamic properties of these models. For example, when
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Table 8: Stabilization Performance of the Benchmark Forecast-Based Rule
λ Opt. AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
1/3 16 12 7 16 1
11 9 7 2 0 6 0
32 2 2 3 4 8 1 2 0
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ, the corresponding row of this table indicates
the percent deviation of the loss function obtained by the benchmark forecast-based rule (given in
equation (9) from the OB policy frontier of each model (%∆L).
deviates more than 20 percent from the outcome-based policy frontier of each model. Evidently,
choosing the policy parameters to minimize the average loss function across the ﬁve models does
not incur large stabilization costs relative to ﬁne-tuning these parameters to a given model. Thus,
the same rule would be nearly optimal even for a policymaker with very diﬀerent (non-ﬂat) prior
beliefs about the accuracy of the ﬁve models.
It is also striking that the policy rule parameters in Table 7 are quite similar for all three non-
zero values of λ. This suggests the possibility of identifying a benchmark rule that performs well
for a fairly wide range of policy preferences as well as for a wide range of prior beliefs about the
dynamic properties of the economy.
Therefore, we now consider the following simple forecast-based policy rule, which has parameter
values nearly identical to those of the optimized rule for λ =1 /3:
it =1 .0it−1 +0 .4(πt+4 − π∗)+0 .4yt. (9)
Table 8 indicates the stabilization performance of this rule for each value of λ>0. As one would
expect, the rule performs very well in all ﬁve models when λ =1 /3. This rule also performs
remarkably well when λ = 1; as in the previous case, the loss function never deviates more than 20
percent from the outcome-based policy frontier. The rule provides reasonably robust performance
even for λ = 3, although the maximum value of %∆L does reach nearly 50 percent in this case.
Based on these results, we conclude that this rule can serve as a robust benchmark for monetary
policy, at least for policymakers who place non-trivial weight on stabilizing the output gap as well
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the performance and robustness of forecast-based monetary pol-
icy rules using ﬁve models that reﬂect divergent views about the dynamic properties of the U.S.
economy. Our analysis yields the following conclusions:
• While forecast-based rules can serve as a useful framework for monetary policy, this class
of rules does not provide substantial gains in stabilization performance compared with simple
outcome-based rules.
• Determinacy is an important consideration in selecting a robust forecast-based rule. For
example, a number of policy rules proposed in the literature generate multiple equilibrium in
several of the macroeconomic models considered here.
• Robust policy rules respond to a short-horizon forecast (not exceeding one year) of a smoothed
measure of inﬂation, incorporate a substantial response to the current output gap, and involve a
relatively high degree of policy inertia.
• We have identiﬁed a speciﬁc forecast-based rule that can serve as a robust benchmark for
monetary policy; this rule performs remarkably well in all ﬁve models for a wide range of policy
preferences.
Our analysis also suggests several fruitful areas for future research. First, while this paper
has focused exclusively on models with rational expectations and short-run nominal inertia, our
methodology can be applied to an even broader set of models that incorporate alternative assump-
tions about expectations formation and about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; this
methodology can also be used in identifying robust policy rules for other economies with diﬀerent
structural characteristics (e.g., small open economies and emerging market economies). Second,
our analysis has focused on instrument rules in which the short-term nominal interest rate responds
directly to the inﬂation forecast, and has not considered the performance of targeting rules that
explicitly minimize the weighted average of the variances of inﬂation and the output gap at a par-
ticular forecast horizon (cf. Svensson (1997), Svensson and Woodford (1999)); in future work, it
will be useful to investigate the extent to which such rules are robust to model uncertainty. Finally,
we have proceeded under the assumption that the parameters of each competing model are known
exactly and that the data series are measured precisely; additional research will be required to
identify rules that are robust to parameter uncertainty and data uncertainty as well as to model
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Appendix
A.1 Forecast-Based Policy Rules From the Literature
This appendix provides additional information regarding the policy rules given in Table 1.
The coeﬃcients of rules B and C were not optimized to a particular model; rather, these rules
were ﬁtted to U.S. data from the past two decades. In particular, rule B is taken from Clarida et
al. (1999a), who estimated this equation by two-stage least squares using quarterly U.S. data over
the period 1982:4-1996:4. The speciﬁcation of rule B is deﬁned on page 4 and page 8 by equations
2.1 and 2.3; the parameter estimates are taken from table 3 of the same paper. Rule C is taken
from Orphanides (1998), who estimated this rule using real-time data on Federal Reserve staﬀ
forecasts of U.S. output gaps and GDP price inﬂation for the period 1987-1992.28 Rules B and C
both suggest that U.S. short-term nominal interest rates during the bulk of the Volker-Greenspan
era can be described reasonably well in terms of systematic responses to a one-year-ahead inﬂation
forecast, the lagged funds rate, and either the current output gap or its one-year-ahead forecast.
Rule D is taken from de Brouwer and Ellis (1998), who found this rule to be near-eﬃcient in
a small model of the Australian economy. The speciﬁcation of the rule is discussed on page 12
(equation 2b), while the good performance for the above choice of parameters is noted on page 16.
This rule involves one-year-ahead forecasts of both the output gap and inﬂation rate (as in rule C),
but does not involve the lagged funds rate.
Rule E is taken from Batini and Nelson (2001), who found that, among the class of rules that
only respond to expected inﬂation and the lagged short-term interest rate, this rule minimizes the
sum of inﬂation and output variability in a small rational expectations model of the U.K. economy.
Rule F is taken from Isard et al. (1999), who found this rule to perform well in a small
moderately-nonlinear model of the U.S. economy with a time-varying NAIRU (Table 8, page 41).
Rules G and H are taken from Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). The generic form of the rule is
discussed on page 222 of that paper; the two parameterizations are taken from table 5.4. on page
228. As noted in the text, these two rules involve the one-quarter annualized inﬂation rate rather
than the four-quarter average inﬂation rate. Conditional on the inﬂation forecast horizon (either 8
or 12 quarters), the coeﬃcients of each rule were optimized using a small U.S. macroeconometric
model with adaptive expectations. Both rules perform nearly as well as the fully-optimal policy rule
that involves the entire set of state variables of the model. The response coeﬃcients are computed
by minimizing a loss function which assigns a relatively high weight to inﬂation variability. The
percentage diﬀerence compared to the fully optimal policy under this loss function is less than 2
percent.
Rule I is taken from Batini and Nelson (2001), who found that, among the class of rules that
only respond to expected inﬂation and the lagged short-term interest rate, this rule minimizes the
sum of inﬂation and output variability in a small adaptive expectations model of the U.K. economy.
28The parameter estimates are taken from the last column of table 8 in Orphanides (1998b). The table also provides
a deﬁnition of the rule. Orphanides considered forecast horizons of zero to four quarters for both the output gap and
inﬂation, and found that speciﬁcations such as rule C involving one-year-ahead forecasts exhibited the most sensible
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(It should be noted that the same authors found rule E to be optimal under rational expectations).
Rule Jis taken from Amano et al. (1999). In this case short-term nominal interest rates
are adjusted so that the spread between short and long rates moves in response to a two-year-
ahead forecast of the four-quarter inﬂation rate. According to the authors, this rule provides a
good approximation to the reference interest rate reaction function used in the Bank of Canada’s
Quarterly Projection Model (page 14); the rule is deﬁned by equation 5 on page 13 of that paper.
Finally, rule K is taken from Batini and Haldane (1999), who analyzed various types of policy
rules in a small forward-looking open-economy model of the Bank of England calibrated to match
U.K. data. This rule is quite similar to rule G, except that the monetary policy instrument is
deﬁned in terms of the ex ante real interest rate, it −Etπt+1. The general form of the rule is given
by equation 1 on page 158 of their paper, while the coeﬃcients of the reference rule are reported
on page 173.
A.2 The Five Macroeconomic Models
This appendix provides further details regarding the ﬁve macroeconomic models utilized in this
paper.
The small stylized model is taken from Woodford (2000a), except that we express nominal
interest rates and inﬂation at annual rates, and our aggregate supply relation includes an exogenous
disturbance. (Our model is also very similar to those used in Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), except that those models
incorporate decision lags for spending and price-setting.) In particular, π indicates the deviation
of the one-quarter inﬂation rate from steady state, y indicates the logarithmic deviation of output
from its ﬂexible-price level, and r∗
t indicates the deviation of the Wicksellian (i.e., ﬂexible-price)
real interest rate from steady state. Equation (3) can be obtained as a log-linear approximation
to the ﬁrst-order condition of optimizing ﬁrms with either Calvo-style staggered price contracts
(Yun (1996)) or convex costs of price adjustment (Rotemberg (1982)); the exogenous disturbance
 t may be viewed as representing transitory changes in monopoly power or tax distortions. (Shifts
in the price markup arise endogenously when both wages and prices are determined by staggered
nominal contracts; cf. Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).) Equation (4) can be obtained as a
log-linear approximation of the representative household’s ﬁrst-order equation in a model in which
consumption, leisure, and real money balances are each additively separable in the utility function,
and total consumption demand is equal to aggregate output.
The basic characteristics of the four structural macroeconometric models are summarized in
Table A1. The method of estimating the structural parameters also varies across the four models:
full-information maximum likelihood estimation was used in estimating the parameters of the FM
model, while the parameters of the other three models were estimated using a combination of
ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares and the generalized method of moments. In the
remainder of this appendix, we highlight further details regarding the speciﬁcation of aggregate
demand, aggregate supply, and the foreign sector of each model.
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Table A1: Basic Characteristics of Four Macroeconometric Models
FM FRB MSR TMCM
IS Components 1 17 5 10
Price Variables 2 7 2 5
Labor Variables 0 4 0 0
Asset Prices 1 7 2 2
Foreign Variables 0 22 09 5
Wage and Price Staggered Generalized Staggered Staggered
Dynamics real wage adjustment real wage nominal
contracts costs contracts contracts
Duration of Bond 10 years 5/10/30 years3 2 years 2 years
Permanent Income N/A 7% 10% 10%
Discount Rate per quarter per quarter per quarter
Estimation Period 1966-941 1966-95 1980-96 1971-86
Notes: 1. FM estimated over 1966:1-1994:4; residuals are computed from 1982:4-1994:1. 2. The
full FRB model contains over 400 foreign variables; in the version of the FRB model used in this
paper, these have been replaced by 2 equations for foreign output and prices. 3. The FRB model
includes bonds with durations of 5, 10 and 30 years, as well as equity prices. The 5-year bond is
used in computing the cost of capital for business equipment and consumer purchases of durables.
equation corresponding to an IS curve. The current output gap depends on its lagged values over
the past two quarters and the lagged value of the long-term real interest rate, which is deﬁned
as a weighted average of ex ante short-term real interest rates with maturity equivalent to a 30-
year coupon bond. The parameter estimates are taken from Fuhrer (1997a). The FM model does
not explicitly include trade variables or exchange rates; instead, net exports (and the relationship
between real interest and real exchange rates) are implicitly incorporated in the IS curve equation.
The MSR model disaggregates real spending into ﬁve components: private consumption, ﬁxed
investment, inventory investment, net exports, and government purchases. The aggregate demand
components exhibit partial adjustment to their respective equilibrium levels, measured as shares of
potential GDP. Equilibrium consumption is a function of permanent income (discounted 10
The TMCM model disaggregates IS components further; for example, spending on ﬁxed in-
vestment is separated into three components: equipment, nonresidential structures, and residential
construction. The speciﬁcation of these equations is very similar to that of the more aggregated
equations in the MSR model. In TMCM, imports follow partial adjustment to an equilibrium level
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justment to an equilibrium level that depends on foreign output and the relative price of exports.
Uncovered interest rate parity determines each bilateral exchange rate (up to a time-varying risk
premium); e.g., the expected one-period-ahead percent change in the DM/USDollar exchange rate
equals the current diﬀerence between U.S. and German short-term interest rates.
The FRB model features about the same level of aggregation as TMCM for private spending
but divides government spending into six components, each of which follows a simple reduced-form
equation that includes a counter-cyclical term. The speciﬁcation of most non-trade private spending
equations follows the generalized adjustment cost model due to Tinsley (1993).
Each component has a speciﬁc ﬂow or stock equilibrium condition; for example, equilibrium
aggregate consumption is proportional to wealth. Households and businesses adjust their spending
in each category according to the solution of a quadratic adjustment cost problem. The resulting
spending decision rules are speciﬁed as forward-looking error correction equations: the current
growth of each spending variable depends on up to three of its own lagged values and on expected
future growth in equilibrium spending, and responds negatively to the lagged percent deviation
between actual and equilibrium spending levels. Exports and non-oil imports are speciﬁed as
error-correction processes with long-run income and price elasticities set equal to unity. Uncovered
interest rate parity determines the multilateral exchange rate, subject to a sovereign risk premium
that moves with the U.S. net external asset position.
Aggregate Supply. In FM, MSR, and TMCM, the aggregate wage rate is determined by
overlapping wage contracts. In particular, the aggregate wage is deﬁned to be the weighted average
of current and three lagged values of the contract wage rate. TMCM follows the speciﬁcation in
Taylor (1980), where the current nominal contract wage is determined as a weighted average of
expected nominal contract wages, adjusted for the expected state of the economy over the life of
the contract. FM and MSR use the overlapping real contract wage speciﬁcation proposed by Buiter
and Jewitt (1981) and implemented by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), in which the real contract wage,
that is the contract wage deﬂated by the aggregate wage, is determined as a weighted average of
expected real contract wages, adjusted for the expected average output gap over the life of the
contract.
In FM and MSR, the aggregate price level is a constant markup over the aggregate wage rate.
In contrast, the output price in TMCM follows a backward-looking error-correction speciﬁcation:
current output price inﬂation depends positively on its own lagged value, on current wage inﬂation,
and on lagged import price inﬂation, and responds negatively (with a coeﬃcient of -0.2) to the
lagged percent deviation of the actual price level from equilibrium. Import prices error-correct
slowly to an equilibrium level equal to a constant markup over a weighted average of foreign prices
converted to dollars. This partial adjustment of import and output prices imparts somewhat more
persistence to output price inﬂation than would result from staggered nominal wages alone.
The FRB model explicitly models potential output as a function of the labor force, crude energy
use, and a composite capital stock, using a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production technology. The
equilibrium output price is a markup over a weighted average of the productivity-adjusted wage
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generalized adjustment cost framework used in the FRB IS block. Wage inﬂation depends on
lagged wage inﬂation over the previous three quarters, as well as expected future growth in prices
and productivity, and a weighted average of expected future unemployment rates. Price inﬂation
depends on its own lagged values over the past two quarters, as well as expected future changes
in equilibrium prices and expected future unemployment rates. In addition, both wages and prices
error-correct to their respective equilibrium levels. As in the other models, a vertical long-run
Phillips curve is imposed in estimation.
Unlike the other three models, the FRB model contains a detailed accounting of various cate-
gories of income, taxes, and stocks, an explicit treatment of labor markets, and endogenous deter-
mination of potential output. Long-run equilibrium in the FRB model is of the stock-ﬂow type;
the income tax rate and real exchange rate risk premium adjust over time to bring government and
foreign debt-to-GDP ratios back to speciﬁed (constant) levels.
The Foreign Sector. Neither FM nor MSR explicitly include foreign variables; in contrast,
both TMCM and the full FRB staﬀ model include detailed treatments of foreign variables. TMCM
features estimated equations for demand components and wages and prices for the other G-7 coun-
tries at about the level of aggregation of the U.S. sector. The full FRB staﬀ model includes a total
of 12 sectors (countries or regions) which encompass the entire global economy. Because of the size
of the model, the cost of solving and computing the moments of the full FRB model is prohibitive.
Previous investigations using TMCM suggest that the characteristics of optimal U.S. monetary
policies are not greatly aﬀected by the precise speciﬁcation of the foreign sector (see Levin et al.
(1999)). Based on these results and the beneﬁts of reduced computational cost, we replaced the
full set of equations describing foreign countries in the FRB staﬀ model with two simple reduced
form equations for foreign output and prices.
A.3 Methodology
Here we describe the methods used to solve each model and obtain its unconditional moments for
a speciﬁc interest rate rule. Then we specify the objective function and constraints faced by the
monetary policymaker, and describe how to obtain the optimal response parameters for a given
type of rule.
Analyzing a Speciﬁc Rule. Our methodology permits the analysis of a wide variety of
rules in which the federal funds rate may depend on its own lagged values as well as the current,
lagged, and expected future values of other model variables. In general, the interest rate rule can














where it is the federal funds rate and the vector z is a set of model variables that enter the interest
rate reaction function. The lagged funds rate coeﬃcients are given by H1
j (j =1t ol), while the
coeﬃcients on other model variables are given by the vectors H2
j(j =1t om)a n dH3
j (j =0t on).
Henceforth we will refer to the combined set of coeﬃcients by the vector H = {H1,H2,H3}. AfterECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 40
discussing how to compute the moments of each model for a speciﬁc value of H, we will consider
the problem of determining the optimal value of H for a given choice of the elements of z and the
lead and lag orders l, m,a n dn.
As in Fuhrer (1997a), we analyze the performance of a speciﬁed policy rule in each model
by computing the reduced form representation of the saddle point solution and then evaluating
an analytic expression for the unconditional second moments of the model variables. For linear
models, this approach yields accurate results far more eﬃciently than simulation-based methods.
To take advantage of these methods, we have constructed a linearized version of TMCM and a
log-linear version of the FRB model; however, these approximations have negligible eﬀects on the
relevant dynamic properties of the two models.






Ajxt−j + Cet = 0 (11)
where x is the vector of all model variables, and e is a vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances
with mean zero and ﬁnite covariance matrix Ω. The interest rate reaction function comprises a
single row of equation (11), while the remaining rows contain the structural equations of the model.
Thus, the parameters of the interest rate rule are contained in one row of the coeﬃcient matrices
Aj(j =1t oM)a n dBj(j =0t oN), while this row of C is identically equal to zero.
We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to equation (11) using the
Anderson and Moore (1985) implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method, modiﬁed





Dj(H)xt−j + F(H)et (12)
where the reduced-form coeﬃcient matrices Dj(j =1t oN)a n dF depend on the monetary
policy parameters H as well as the structural parameters of the model. By deﬁning the vector
˜ xt =( xt−1,....,xt−N), we can express this solution in companion form:
˜ xt = P(H)˜ xt−1 + Q(H)et (13)




PjQΩQ P j (14)
Using the implicit expression V0 = PV0P + QΩQ , we compute V0 iteratively using the doubling
algorithm described in Hansen and Sargent (1997), modiﬁed to take advantage of sparse matrix
functions. Given Vo, the autocovariance matrices of ˜ xt are readily computed using the relationship
Vj = PjV0.
The Optimization Problem. For speciﬁed values of λ and σ∆i, and for a given functional
form of the policy rule, we determine the parameter values of this rule that minimize the lossECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 41
function in equation (7) subject to the constraint that the unconditional standard deviation of
∆it cannot exceed σ∆i. For a given set of rule parameters, we use the methods described above
to obtain the reduced-form solution matrices G and H, compute the unconditional moments, and
calculate the value of the objective function. To determine the optimal parameters of the rule,
we use the Matlab CONSTR routine, which iteratively updates the parameter vector in order to
minimize the loss function subject to the fnds rate volatility constraint and the restriction that the
optimal rule must yield a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Thus, to solve this optimization problem, it is necessary to compute hundreds or even thousands
of rational expectations solutions at alternative values of the policy rule parameters. Given our
objective of performing a systematic analysis of policy frontiers for a range of diﬀerent functional
forms of the interest rate rule, it is essential to make use of the highly eﬃcient solution algorithms
outlined above. On a Sun Ultra Enterprise 3000 computer about as fast as an Intel Pentium II
300 Mhz computer only a few CPU seconds are needed to solve and compute the moments of a
small-scale model like FM or MSR, while solving a large-scale macroeconometric model like TMCM
or the FRB model requires about ﬁve CPU minutes.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 42
A.4 Coeﬃcients of Optimized Rules
Table A2 reports the optimized values of ρ, α,a n dβ for each of the forecast-based rules considered
in Section 4; the optimized values of the inﬂation forecast horizon θ and the output gap forecast
horizon κ of each rule are indicated in Table 3. Table A3 reports the optimized values of ρ, α,a n d
β for the rules with ﬁxed forecast horizons considered at the end of Section 5.
Table A2: Coeﬃcients of Optimized Forecast-Based Rules
Model λ FB4 Rules FB1 Rules FB4XG Rules
ρα β ρα β ρα β
0 .78 16.55 -.64 1.78 12.37 0.02 1.57 51.46 -
Opt. 1/3 1.57 7.27 6.12 1.50 2.41 5.94 0.42 8.80 -
AD-AS 1 1.55 3.04 6.23 1.52 1.18 6.15 0.42 8.90 -
3 1.55 1.49 6.26 1.53 0.75 6.23 0.47 8.34 -
0 .96 .51 .10 .97 0.45 .10 1.21 2.55 -
1/3 .97 .86 .68 1.27 1.95 2.07 1.28 20.29 -
FM 1 1.00 .67 .98 1.35 2.11 3.66 .77 4.60 -
3 1.02 .43 1.12 1.60 1.97 5.66 .62 3.47 -
0 1.28 5.47 .02 1.19 3.73 .03 1.27 5.45 -
1/3 1.16 1.63 1.46 1.37 2.85 2.42 .96 7.41 -
FRB 1 1.19 1.21 1.97 1.42 2.14 3.46 .94 8.70 -
3 1.19 .74 2.16 1.41 1.32 3.74 .93 8.47 -
0 .96 4.14 .02 .92 2.21 -.09 .95 3.90 -
1/3 1.25 2.91 1.92 1.30 3.14 2.21 -.06 3.11 -
MSR 1 1.22 1.71 2.01 1.26 1.76 2.20 -.38 1.79 -
3 1.19 .99 2.03 1.22 1.00 2.14 -.52 1.14 -
0 1.04 3.59 .11 1.16 4.39 .21 1.14 4.92 -
1/3 .97 1.33 1.28 .98 1.32 1.27 .73 3.41 -
TMCM 1 1.31 1.52 4.93 .96 0.55 1.43 .58 3.02 -
3 1.33 .85 5.10 1.33 0.77 5.00 .50 7.91 -
Notes: For each model, each value of the preference parameter λ, and each speciﬁcation of the
policy rule, this table indicates the optimal coeﬃcients ρ, α and β. FB4 rules utilize the four-
quarter average inﬂation rate ˜ π, while FB1 rules utilize the one-quarter annualized inﬂation rate
π; FB4XG rules have no explicit response to the output gap (that is, β ≡ 0).ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 43
Table A3: Coeﬃcients of Optimized FB4 Rules with Fixed Forecast Horizons
Model λθ =4 ,κ=0 θ =8 ,κ=0 θ =4 ,κ=4
ρα β ρα β ραβ
0 .88 .65 -.00 1.19 2.05 -.04 1.03 .78 .11
1/3 .94 .54 .32 1.07 .58 .46 1.00 .85 .49
FM 1 .85 .39 .50 .84 .61 .50 1.02 .73 .90
3 .82 .21 .64 .82 .32 .60 1.04 .48 1.13
0 1.27 5.31 .04 2.50 49.22 -.05 1.28 5.53 .02
1/3 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.13 .96 2.12 8.65 6.79
FRB 1 1.03 .54 1.10 1.03 .61 1.08 2.22 5.97 8.84
3 1.03 .30 1.13 1.03 .33 1.12 2.11 3.38 8.69
0 .95 8.39 -.33 .97 18.96 .65 1.00 4.16 -.35
1/3 1.11 2.21 1.38 1.12 3.85 1.44 1.80 28.00 24.00
MSR 1 1.08 1.20 1.42 1.09 1.81 1.47 1.80 16.00 24.00
3 1.05 .65 1.41 1.06 .89 1.44 1.80 8.00 24.00
0 1.74 14.77 .30 1.27 12.90 2.17 1.82 17.11 .26
1/3 1.02 1.92 1.39 1.04 6.22 1.73 1.06 13.53 10.21
TMCM 1 .97 .80 1.47 .96 .04 1.53 1.00 7.87 9.74
3 .95 .42 1.49 .95 .04 1.53 1.23 6.12 12.00
A.5 Additional Robustness Results
Table A4 provides robustness results for each optimized ﬁxed-horizon FB4 rule in each of the four
macroeconometric models when the rule is implemented using model-consistent forecasts (following
the approach described in Section 5.1), while Table A5 reports the performance of these rules using
model-inconsistent forecasts (as in Section 5.2). Table A6 reports on the performance of the policy
rules taken from the literature (described in Section 2), when each rule is implemented using model-
consistent forecasts.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 44
Table A4: Robustness of Fixed-Horizon Rules with Model-Consistent Forecasts
λ =0 λ =1 /3
Forecast Rule- Rule-
Horizons Gen. True Economy Model Gen. True Economy Model
θκ Model FM FRB MSR TMCM Model FM FRB MSR TMCM
4 0 FM 8 8 60 14 FM 2 15 13 2
FRB 56 -10 3 -2 FRB 13 8 15 1
MSR 5 -4 5 2 MSR 19 17 9 -1
TMCM 145 -9 25 -2 TMCM 9 11 10 1
80 F M 3 4 9 2 3 F M 1 8 1 0 2 1 8
FRB 1 -4 20 15 FRB 16 14 23 5
MSR 22 6 113 ME MSR 14 49 10 5
TMCM 36 37 269 24 TMCM 13 69 13 5
4 4 FM 1 -1 17 -7 FM 0 11 24 6
FRB 68 -10 8 -5 FRB 8 -5 10 3
MSR 33 7 12 0 MSR 3 -4 13 ME
TMCM 145 -8 3 -2 TMCM 1 -2 17 11
λ =1 λ =3
Forecast Rule- Rule-
Horizons Gen. True Economy Model Gen. True Economy Model
θκ Model FM FRB MSR TMCM Model FM FRB MSR TMCM
4 0 FM 4 27 22 7 FM 5 35 27 15
FRB 19 7 12 1 FRB 25 4 8 1
MSR 19 14 6 1 MSR 21 10 4 1
TMCM 11 8 12 0 TMCM 12 6 9 0
8 0 FM 4 35 23 12 FM 3 23 15 5
FRB 21 10 17 3 FRB 27 6 11 3
MSR 18 28 7 4 MSR 21 16 4 4
TMCM 272 77 222 2 TMCM 155 44 108 0
4 4 FM 0 12 39 8 FM 0 15 56 10
FRB 9 -6 18 4 FRB 12 -8 27 4
MSR 2 -5 23 ME MSR 2 -7 35 ME
TMCM 2 0 ME 25 TMCM 4 -2 41 42
Note: For a given value of λ and a given combination of the inﬂation and output forecast hori-
zons, the optimized rule is taken from the speciﬁed “rule-generating model” and is evaluated in
each alternative “true economy model” using model-consistent forecasts. Each entry indicates the
relative loss (%∆L) of the rule compared with the OB policy frontier of the true economy model;
the notation “ME” indicates that the rule yields multiple equilibria in the speciﬁed model.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 45
Table A5: Robustness of Fixed-Horizon Rules with Model-Inconsistent Forecasts
Forecast
Horizons Optimized for FM Optimized for MSR
θκ λ FRB MSR TMCM FRB TMCM
4 0 0 9 85 17 10 16
1/3 15 14 7 11 7
12 5 2 3 1 3 8 8
33 1 2 7 1 4 5 6
80 0 8 4 1 7 1 1 8
1/3 14 11 3 10 7
12 7 2 6 1 5 8 8
32 0 1 6 8 5 6
4 4 0 10 63 6 12 2
1/3 16 30 10 441 178
1 21 20 16 ME 240
3 29 27 21 ME 281
Note: For each value of the preference parameter λ and each choice of the inﬂation forecast
horizon θ and output gap forecast horizon κ, the coeﬃcients of the rule are optimized using the
speciﬁed “rule-generating” model (either FM or MSR), and then this rule is evaluated in each
alternative “true economy” model using forecasts obtained from the rule-generating model. Each
entry indicates the percent deviation of the loss function from the outcome-based policy frontier
of the true economy model (%∆L); the notation “ME” indicates that the rule yields multiple
equilibria.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 46
Table A6: Performance of Rules from the Literature
λ =0 λ =1 /3
Opt. Opt.
Rule AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
A 551 46 47 419 50 144 7 47 62 48
B 160 32 32 204 38 71 6 92 40 33
C ME 144 141 656 137 ME 49 156 135 109
D ME 107 44 367 63 ME 10 60 105 55
E 176 5 -7 30 2 91 71 193 121 15
F ME 100 ME 514 138 ME 19 ME 117 117
G ME 60 ME ME ME ME 8 ME ME ME
H ME 56 ME ME ME ME 6 ME ME ME
I M E M EM EM E M E M E M EM EM E M E
JME 121 ME ME ME ME 18 ME ME ME
K ME 125 ME 612 262 ME 38 ME 130 210
λ =1 λ =3
Opt. Opt.
Rule AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM AD-AS FM FRB MSR TMCM
A 332 17 110 108 71 628 53 211 187 99
B 90 14 211 53 36 101 42 396 81 41
C ME 29 273 136 102 ME 34 424 166 100
D ME 19 135 185 76 ME 61 77 301 103
E 275 179 462 246 34 303 373 882 387 51
F ME 33 ME 179 131 ME 80 ME 277 150
G M E1 8M EM E M E M E5 6M EM E M E
H M E1 5M EM E M E M E5 0M EM E M E
I M E M EM EM E M E M E M EM EM E M E
JME 22 ME ME ME ME 56 ME ME ME
K ME 36 ME 158 201 ME 64 ME 214 198
Notes: The speciﬁcation of each rule is given in Table 1. The rule is evaluated in each alternative
“true economy” model using model-consistent forecasts. Each entry indicates the relative loss
(%∆L) of the rule compared with the OB policy frontier of the true economy model; the notation
“ME” indicates that the rule yields multiple equilibria in the speciﬁed model.ECB • Working Paper No 68 • July 2001 47
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